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Technical experts’ perspectives of justice-related norms: Lessons from everyday 1 
environmental practices in Indonesia. 2 
1. Introduction 3 
Development and environmental conflicts have increasingly featured divergences between 4 
representations of justice provided by environmental management policies and demands of 5 
justice claimed by local affected social groups (Martin et al. 2014). If local affected people 6 
perceive environmental policies as not reflecting social objectives, or as ‘unjust,’ the 7 
effectiveness of management practices can be undermined (Mariki, Svarstad, and Benjaminsen 8 
2015). To align environmental management with local justice demands, it is vital to understand 9 
the governance processes and power relations between policy actors through which any 10 
environmental policies are interpreted and implemented (Jacobi et al. 2017). As international 11 
environmental governance initiatives and national governments have increasingly sought to 12 
influence local environmental practices, linking local social and environmental objectives with 13 
international and national governance practices can potentially reduce any negative impacts 14 
of management practices on forest-dependent communities (Sikor et al. 2014). 15 
A multifaceted framing of environmental justice has become influential for identifying, 16 
explaining, and addressing uneven distributions of environmental impacts on forest-17 
dependent communities and other socially marginalized groups. Historically, environmental 18 
justice has focused on ‘distributive justice,’ which investigates the fairness of the distribution 19 
outcomes (Bullard 1994). While the concept of distributive justice remains essential, a 20 
multidimensional frame of environmental justice has integrated ‘recognitional justice,’ 21 
addressing the processes that result in unjust distribution (Young 1990). Recognitional justice 22 
explores how misrecognition of culturally suppressed identities and worldviews can lead to 23 
distributive injustice. Another dimension of justice, i.e., procedural justice, explores fair public 24 
participation processes and outcomes; key issues include legitimacy, transparency, and 25 
accountability in institutional decision-making (Suiseeya and Caplow 2013).  26 
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Norms related to environmental justice have become discernible both in local struggle 27 
claims (Temper et al. 2018) and global sustainability objectives (Sikor and Newell 2014). 28 
Critical institutional analysis, mainly its focus on norms (Ostrom 2009), has contributed to 29 
understanding how justice perceptions are shaped in natural resource management (e.g., 30 
Agarwal 2001; Ribot 2012). Essentially, norms are the customary rules about the way things 31 
should be and ought to be done in particular contexts. Others, including Acharya (2014), 32 
Cleaver (2012), and Paavola (2007), further reconceptualize institutions in environmental 33 
governance central to justice-related norms. Such norms are the socially determined rules of 34 
fairness in travel between people and in the allocation of social goods. Postcolonial feminists 35 
have broadly recorded norms that can shape ideas of justice in a wide range of environmental 36 
governance phenomena. As an example, indigenous studies have investigated discrimination 37 
and marginalization of indigenous worldviews in neoliberal conservation and development 38 
initiatives, resulting in claims of injustices and conflicts (e.g., Li 2014; Doolittle 2010). Gender 39 
studies have portraited misrepresentation of top-down management tools enshrined in 40 
patriarchal institutions and the socio-environmental struggles asserted by women in land 41 
practices (e.g., Deere and Leal 2001; Nussbaum 2000). Other studies expand the knowledge 42 
sphere of justice-related norms, illustrating the importance of meeting societal standards on 43 
dignity (Su and Mangada 2020), sense of belongings (Eckenwiler 2018), and community 44 
benefits (Cowell, Bristow, and Munday 2011) on improving social acceptability of 45 
environmental management strategies in specific cultural structures. These insights show that 46 
social expectations of justice are unique to local contexts, but they are not solely locally-47 
constituted. Negotiations at various sites and on different platforms by actors from global to 48 
local scales can affect how justice is delivered to forest-dependent communities. 49 
Environmental governance is a multi-scalar and dynamic process, where both formal 50 
governmental regulations and local customs contribute to shaping practical arrangements and 51 
outcomes of environmental and development policies (Acharya 2011). To transform externally-52 
conceived norms, for example, related to justice, from the international or national level into 53 
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the sub-national practice, involves the interplay of various intermediary actors from the 54 
government, civil society, and the private sector (Dawson et al. 2018). These intermediary 55 
actors may represent diverse stakeholders and carry out formal and informal roles in 56 
interpreting and implement national policies on forests, land, and other natural resources in a 57 
particular social context (Cleaver 2015).  58 
 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), as the world’s most widespread 59 
environmental policy tool, and its role in bridging local justice concerns and global 60 
sustainability goals is essential in many natural-resource-rich countries where EIAs are the 61 
only environmental policy tools that are publicly acknowledged (Lawrence 2013; Morgan 62 
2012). The UN Environment (2018) also identifies EIA as a crucial platform for achieving the 63 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and other related frameworks such as the 64 
Strategic Plan for Biodiversity. EIA is relevant to distributive justice because its objectives 65 
are fundamentally concerned with the impact of project actions on specific groups or 66 
populations (Walker 2010), while engaging cultural minorities’ voices may also promote 67 
recognitional justice in decision-making procedures (Hanna et al. 2014). Procedural justice 68 
concerns the ‘effectiveness’ of EIA, with literature exploring to what extent the formal 69 
procedure of EIA addresses specific goals (procedural outcomes) and how the practice of 70 
EIA achieves those goals (substantive outcomes) (Cashmore et al. 2010). Numerous studies 71 
have explored the barriers to effective participation in EIA faced by local communities 72 
(Cashmore and Axelsson 2013; Morgan 2012); however, few have examined the barriers 73 
created or faced by those involved in delivering the EIAs, and their potential to influence the 74 
substantive outcomes and the incorporation of justice in project negotiations.  75 
Through exploring the perspective of intermediaries involved in everyday EIA 76 
governance practices at the sub-national level, this article addresses three questions: 1) What 77 
are EIA intermediaries’ perceptions and prioritizations of justice-related norms? 2) What 78 
structural factors influence the travel of justice-related norms between governance scales? 3) 79 
Through which platforms do those EIA intermediaries negotiate justice-related norms? 80 
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Using semi-structured interviews, this article explored a case study of EIA in Indonesia to 81 
investigate the perspectives of sub-national intermediaries involved in its technical review 82 
process, from governmental agencies, private consultancies, and academia. Indonesia has 83 
one of the world’s highest deforestation rates, and EIA acts as one of the criteria for granting 84 
licenses for development projects (Swangjang 2018), yet critiques of its fairness persist. This 85 
article contributes new empirical evidence and insights to the everyday environmental 86 
arrangements regarding justice, as shaped by sub-national intermediaries. 87 
2. Literature review: Critical institutionalism and travel of justice-related norms  88 
This article uses a critical institutionalism lens and pays attention to the power relationships 89 
underlying people’s interactions that shape resource management arrangements and 90 
outcomes (Cleaver 2012). In contrast to the assumption of an optimal institution (Ostrom 91 
2002), which considers the relationship between policy and local practices as direct and linear, 92 
Acharya (2004) proposes a critical approach emphasizing the complexity of institutions 93 
entwined in everyday social life. Both structural factors and individual choices, particularly the 94 
role of local actors, are considered in shaping local governance arrangements (de Koning 2014; 95 
de Sardan 2015). That said, local actors are not passive followers of predetermined, top-down 96 
objectives, but actively negotiate and shape norms through a combination of resources and 97 
capabilities in certain normative beliefs and social contexts (Coggan et al. 2013; Kumar 2014; 98 
Mukhtarov 2014). 99 
Conceptually, this approach shows that norm diffusion and development is not solely a 100 
downward process from international to local scales. Instead, national and sub-national actors 101 
can influence global objectives of environmental governance from below (Hargreaves et al. 102 
2013; Schomers, Sattler, and Matzdorf 2015). They may seek to create a transnational justice 103 
network in mobilizing local struggles (Caouette 2007), offer knowledge services to facilitate 104 
interactions among actors (Sternlieb et al. 2013), and collaborate to shape the outcomes of 105 
environmental governance (Schröter et al. 2018). Transforming justice-related norms into 106 
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local environmental governance practices remains challenging due to barriers of local 107 
implementation capacity and to ideological differences in the conceptualization of justice 108 
amongst various actors (Dawson 2018). To enable the integration of local justice concerns into 109 
environmental practices, they need to be represented and mobilized in policy negotiations 110 
which is often through the representation by intermediary actors.  111 
Intermediary actors from governments, private sector, and civil society (e.g., policy 112 
managers, environmental consultancies and NGOs) engage in both formal decision-making 113 
settings and informal processes, such as protest, media, and other lobbying approaches, which 114 
influence norms formation and travel (Funder and Marani 2015). These intermediaries 115 
perform as brokers in development (de Sardan 2005) who seek to or are claimed to represent 116 
objectives held by local people in the environmental governance practices (Sikor et al. 2019). 117 
They may work vertically between governance levels and horizontally across platforms and 118 
issues, attempting to (re)interpret and (re)constitute the objectives of environmental 119 
management, such as those included in policies, to find congruence with local customs and 120 
priorities (Lewis and Mosse 2006; Mosse 2005). It is noted that intermediaries may not act 121 
consistently for local interests. Instead, they may prioritize individual or organizational 122 
agendas or represent contested causes for different stakeholders in different forums (Booth 123 
2012). The perspectives of intermediary actors with regards to justice are influenced by certain 124 
social and cultural context, and the intermediaries’ norms related to justice and the 125 
communities who they are speaking for can therefore affect how they interpret and mobilize 126 
local concerns of justice.  127 
Young (1990)’s and Fraser (2008)’s arguments on recognitional justice, which 128 
emphasize political domination and oppression underlying the causes of unjust distribution of 129 
social goods, can be used to understand the intermediaries’ norms related to justice. Fraser 130 
(2007) argues that misrecognition is constructed in institutional subordination, meaning the 131 
interests and values of culturally privileged groups define peoples’ institutional experiences in 132 
society. In contrast, culturally suppressed identities and communities are often not recognized, 133 
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misrecognized and disrespected by other social members. Such subordination is deeply tied to 134 
economic inequality and this inequality must be examined in a particular cultural and social 135 
context rather than ideal procedures. It is because institutional, social and cultural structures 136 
that construct and mediate social relations are keys for explaining why some social groups have 137 
more privileges in accessing social goods than others (Young 1990, 22). It is therefore crucial 138 
to understand the actors the intermediaries interact, collaborate with and represent, and the 139 
factors underlying the choices made by intermediaries, especially about the justice-related 140 
norms they prioritize and the type of platforms they use to articulate their agendas (Dawson et 141 
al. 2018). 142 
Institutionally, physically, and socially derived resources are necessary to access power 143 
by intermediaries in their attempts to influence the process and outcomes of environmental 144 
governance. Rules, either constitutional or regulative, can be institutional resources for those 145 
who have more experience of using those rules in advancing their objectives (Hrabanski et al. 146 
2013). For example, studies have questioned the practices and representations of enforcing the 147 
law through the legal use of violence by state agents (see the volume by Blundo and Glasman 148 
(2013)). Moreover, travel of justice-related norms can be enabled or restricted by the extent to 149 
which minorities’ voices are engaged in institutional platforms (Eastwood 2011; Sikor and Câm 150 
2016). For instance, intermediaries may find it challenging to include indigenous worldviews 151 
in decision-making when national policies provide little recognition of customary land rights 152 
(Papillon and Rodon 2017).  153 
Effective norms travel may be enabled when intermediaries have access to physical 154 
resources (e.g., proper work facilities) and social resources (e.g., close relationship with other 155 
actors) (Bosselmann and Lund 2013; Pham et al. 2010). In contrast, articulating justice-related 156 
norms may, in turn, constitute a source of power by providing intermediaries with a 157 
justification for resource access, such as external funding and knowledge support (Lindell 158 
2009; Sikor et al. 2019). Studies of the role of intermediaries in facilitating the travel of justice-159 
related norms are still emerging (Dawson 2018). For an improved understanding of the 160 
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practices of these intermediaries, this article, therefore, draws attention to the interactions 161 
between different intermediaries within project debates in the EIA process at the sub-national 162 
level.  163 
Researchers and practitioners of EIA have increasingly acknowledged that a rationalist 164 
EIA model, which favors the setting up of ‘best practice’ and pays little attention to the power 165 
relations in the implementation processes, is deficient in achieving substantive outcomes of 166 
sustainability and justice (Rozema et al. 2012; Walker 2010). Literature has started to explore 167 
political and social factors affecting the effectiveness of EIA at multiple scales. For example, 168 
Connelly and Richard (2005) revealed the structural barriers to mobilizing environmental 169 
justice values in the commonly expert-driven approach of EIA, which have prioritized 170 
procedural elements of justice, rather than facilitating discussions about the costs and benefits 171 
linked to local culture, i.e., distributional justice. Williams and Dupuy (2017) found that the 172 
rationalist approach of EIA did not always match the local context of environmental decision-173 
making, which has increased the vulnerability of the EIA procedure to corruption and results 174 
in ineffective participation. Studies related to power and political dynamics remain 175 
underexplored, and technocratic approaches that seek the ‘best practice’ of EIA still dominate 176 
scholarly attention (Cashmore and Axelsson 2013). The role and influence of various actors, 177 
especially the intermediaries, in achieving equitable outcomes from EIA remain limited. This 178 
article, which considers the perspectives and prioritization of intermediary actors around 179 
issues of justice, is thus instrumental in improving the understanding of the formation and 180 
implementation of just local governance arrangements. 181 
3. Methodology 182 
3.1. Case study 183 
EIA, locally referred to as AMDAL (Analisis Mengenai Dampak Lingkungan), was 184 
introduced into Indonesia in 1982 during Suharto’s authoritarian regime. The AMDAL 185 
system aims to make management plans to prevent, minimize, mitigate or compensate for 186 
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adverse impacts identified. The granting of an environmental permit (Izin Lingkungan) 187 
through AMDAL is a prerequisite for the operation of large-scale development projects and 188 
therefore a vital, if limited, environmental safeguard mechanism in Indonesia. Following the 189 
country’s decentralization in 1999, AMDAL introduced a participatory mechanism. AMDAL 190 
legislation also requires particular attention to the communities and vulnerable groups 191 
potentially affected by any proposed land-use project, and calls for respect for local 192 
knowledge of land-use practices.  193 
AMDAL is arguably the only public policy tool that requires public participation in 194 
environmental decision-making in Indonesia. Critiques of its fairness however have pointed 195 
out the procedural nature of AMDAL which serves as a mere formality instead of a meaningful 196 
participation platform to land-use decision-making (Hasan, Nahiduzzaman, and Aldosary 197 
2018; McCarthy and Zen 2010; Purnama 2003). Studies, investigative reports and news 198 
revealed that public consultations during AMDAL often involve only businesses and political 199 
ruling elites, such as village heads, religious chiefs and landowners. These actors, however, are 200 
usually assumed to represent the voices of various stakeholders (Leitmann and Dore 2005). 201 
Also, local stakeholders often have limited access to project information or a low capacity to 202 
fully engage in the decision-making. For example, local stakeholders do not often understand 203 
the purpose of AMDAL (Qipra 2005) and the implications of attending public consultation 204 
(Gore and Fischer 2014). Issues of corruption also persist as barriers to just AMDAL practice 205 
and forest governance in general in Indonesia (Muslihudin et al. 2018). These conditions 206 
therefore enable the investigation of plural ideas of EJ in this study. 207 
 The processes of AMDAL consist of public consultation, review of impact analysis, 208 
and environmental permit granting. The review of impact analysis in AMDAL comprises two 209 
stages: technical evaluation and impact management evaluation. This article focuses on the 210 
institutional intermediaries involved in the technical evaluation as they directly engage in the 211 
interpretation and implementation of national environmental policies.  212 
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Technical evaluation of AMDAL is conducted under each national, provincial, and 213 
district environmental authority. According to the Government Regulation No. 27/2012 on 214 
Environmental Permit, the intermediaries involved in the stage of technical evaluation are 215 
ecological and social experts (usually from local universities and research institutes), 216 
governmental officers who work in various agencies responsible for environmental impacts 217 
control (such as agriculture, forestry, and land-use planning), and environmental consultants 218 
whom companies hire to conduct impact analyses. These technical experts negotiate the 219 
project’s compliance with laws and regulations, the scoping of the impact study, the 220 
methodology used for data collection and analysis, and the feasibility of impact management 221 
and monitoring plan. Their inputs are then considered in the second stage of impact review 222 
(see the perspectives and roles of intermediaries in impact management evaluation in Lai 223 
and Hamilton (2020)), which will result in a final decision regards environmental permit 224 
granting. 225 
3.2 Study methods 226 
The findings were based on fieldwork conducted in East Kalimantan province between 227 
February and July 2018. Natural resource exploitation has dominated the economy of the 228 
province, which had led to numerous development projects applying for AMDAL review each 229 
year. Simultaneously, land-use conflicts related to environmental degradation have arisen as 230 
the majority of the population still live in rural areas and are dependent on forest resources 231 
(Fünfgeld 2016).  232 
A total of 38 intermediaries, i.e., technical experts of AMDAL, participated in this 233 
study. These comprised 26 governmental officers, six academics, three academics who also 234 
worked as consultants, and three consultants; who between them represented a wide range 235 
of disciplines and fields, including forestry, agriculture, hydrology, biodiversity, health, labor 236 
rights, sociology, spatial planning, and transportation. Three environmental agencies in the 237 
province provided lists and contacts of the technical experts. Due to a considerable number 238 
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of consultants being available, the consultant candidates were selected based on three 239 
criteria: 1) the person was handling at least one AMDAL project during the fieldwork period, 240 
2) the person was based in East Kalimantan (in consideration of research budget and time 241 
constraint), and 3) at least three other technical experts recommended the person. 242 
Conventionally, some consultants may be included in the work team of any AMDAL project 243 
as a nominal head and not involved directly in the analysis of the AMDAL projects. The 244 
environmental agency is also not usually informed if a consultant leaves the position or 245 
changes the contact. Seeking recommendations from other experts is therefore useful for 246 
ensuring that the researcher approached the interviewees who are relevant to the issues 247 
studied. 248 
The intermediaries consulted were mostly senior staff in their organizations with an 249 
average age of 46 years old (between 32 and 67 years old, excluding one interviewee whose 250 
age was unknown). Thirty-five of the 38 interviewees were male. This study identified only 251 
three female government officers during sampling, and all three participated in the 252 
interviews. There was no female academic registered in the technical teams visited and no 253 
female consultants were recommended by three other technical experts. Geographical 254 
information and some information sources in Section 4.3 were anonymized to maintain 255 
confidentiality. Participants granted consent to publication based on the confidentiality of 256 
these data. The interviewees’ information is in the appendix, where actual jobs are not shown, 257 
but grouped into broad categories. 258 
This study included a total of 46 semi-structured interviews. Some individuals were 259 
interviewed more than once for either completing the question sets or answering follow-up 260 
questions. Some of them contributed more inputs than others, which could imply more 261 
influence on our findings. All interviewees were consulted for all questions designed in this 262 
study nevertheless. Interviews were held in either public space (e.g., a coffee shop) or private 263 
office/meeting room in the interviewees’ workplace, except one in a shared workplace and 264 
two in the interviewee’s house. The conversations lasted on average 1.5 hours, ranging from 265 
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30 minutes to 3 hours. Language use was based on the preference of the research 266 
participants; most of them communicated in a mixture of Indonesian and English, while 267 
some used either language alone throughout the conversation. The first author of this paper 268 
is fluent in both of these languages and conducted all the fieldwork and interviews for this 269 
research. 270 
Interviews consisted of three sets of open-ended questions. The first set of questions 271 
explored the experience of the intermediary - as well as those of other intermediaries they 272 
knew - in participating in the AMDAL review and sought to capture their perspectives of 273 
justice as a technical expert. The intermediaries got to know the other intermediaries through 274 
sitting on the reviewing meetings together; some of them, however, were also colleagues in 275 
the same organization or had collaborated on other projects beyond the technical review of 276 
AMDAL. The second question set investigated the social and cultural contexts underlying the 277 
AMDAL policies and practices, and the barriers to the travel of norms as perceived by the 278 
intermediaries. The final set of questions explored the challenges faced by the intermediaries 279 
in negotiating their agendas and the opportunities identified, or the strategies used in 280 
overcoming those challenges.  281 
Interviews were audio-recorded after explaining the research objective and obtaining 282 
informed consent. The respondents’ permission for recording was reconfirmed when the 283 
conversation involved sensitive topics. Data were transcribed and analyzed through thematic 284 
coding to identify the intermediaries’ perceptions and prioritization of justice-related norms 285 
under the category of justice-related issues, factors to norm travel, governance scales, and 286 
platforms of norm travel. The justice theme explored the prioritization of distributive, 287 
procedural, and recognitional justice norms in environmental governance. The factors to 288 
norm travel recorded the factors facilitating or constraining the travel of norms. The 289 
governance scales captured how norms travel between the national, sub-national, and local 290 
levels. Finally, the platforms of norm travel illustrated the type of platforms (formal or 291 
informal) the intermediaries used to pursue their agendas and the actors they interacted with.  292 
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4. Results 293 
4.1. Intermediaries’ perspective of justice-related norms in the AMDAL 294 
process 295 
This section discusses intermediaries’ perception and prioritization of justice-related norms. 296 
Norms related to distributive justice and procedural justice dominated the interviews, while 297 
the intermediaries discussed little issues about the recognition of minorities’ values. 298 
Distribution of the responsibility of impact management was the primary concern of the 299 
intermediaries, as demonstrated in the following quotes: 300 
“Companies should fulfill their commitments on compensation, employment, and impact management 301 
[…] it is their responsibility.” (Senior government manager) 302 
“Some local NGOs and people are passionate about conservation but have limited abilities [...] Who 303 
should bear the cost of empowerment? Is it the company, the government, or the people?” (Former 304 
senior government manager) 305 
The intermediaries consulted highlighted concerns about the disparity in recipients of 306 
the costs and benefits associated with the developments addressed by the AMDAL, including 307 
between 1) national and sub-national government; 2) companies and local communities, and 308 
3) current and future generations: 309 
“Those companies take our coal, but we do not get money in return. Profit goes to the central 310 
government.” (Academic and consultant) 311 
“Companies leave with resource and profit. Local people stay and bear the consequences.” (Government 312 
officer) 313 
“AMDAL covers only the [responsibility of] impact [management] within a project period. But many 314 




The discussion also related to procedural justice, focused on how to empower existing 317 
participants, namely the opinion leaders of local communities and NGOs, rather than 318 
questioning who should participate. The technical experts commonly expected AMDAL to 319 
open up political space for negotiating land-use decisions:  320 
 “AMDAL allows a space where companies, communities, and NGOs can negotiate. I hope local 321 
communities use this chance to understand the impacts and make sure their concerns are answered.” 322 
(Senior government manager) 323 
AMDAL has also provided a legislative ground for supporting the objectives of 324 
sustainable development, as perceived by the technical experts: 325 
“Which company does not pursue profit? Which community does not want a comfortable life […] But 326 
whether a project is [environmentally] feasible, there are laws to follow.” (Former senior government 327 
manager) 328 
Finally, the intermediaries considered AMDAL as a tool for empowering local 329 
communities by offering a platform for knowledge building: 330 
“Public consultation should inform local communities on the project impacts [...] Not just tell them how 331 
much they will be compensated.” (Academic)  332 
“People often discuss their concern about diseases in the meeting. I use this opportunity to explain to 333 
them” (Government officer) 334 
While the interviewees commonly perceived that, as AMDAL technical experts, they are 335 
neutral to project interests, they were skeptical of their influence on decision-making:  336 
“The technical team just gives suggestions [on the impact analysis]. The company decides whether to 337 
accept it.” (Senior government manager) 338 
As a result, several intermediaries were discouraged from contributing to meaningful 339 
AMDAL debates, instead approaching it as a routine task to fulfill: 340 
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“I give comments based on my knowledge. However, the companies and the people might not like it [...] 341 
Just let them do whatever they want.” (Government officer) 342 
A lack of influence on decisions coupled with low motivation leads to the question of 343 
whether the intermediaries have adequately safeguarded the quality of impact analysis. Some 344 
interviewees were concerned about the accountability of intermediaries: 345 
“People who are involved in AMDAL should be accountable for their opinions [...] They could not just 346 
speak whatever comes to their mind.” (Government officer) 347 
“We are just brokers – neither do I have influence on nor liability to decisions.” (Government officer) 348 
Related to who participates, the intermediaries had little engagement in the discussion 349 
or promotion of recognitional justice. The interviewees were asked to talk about issues of 350 
indigenous land rights and participants’ identities (usually male, landowners, and opinion 351 
leaders) and most were satisfied with the existing arrangement of public participation:  352 
“It is fair enough to involve local opinion leaders […] More people, more chaos.” (Former senior 353 
government manager) 354 
“Landowners and local opinion leaders [tokoh-tokoh masyarakat] are invited to public consultations. 355 
Landless people are, of course, welcomed to join, but it does not really concern their interests.” 356 
(Environmental consultant) 357 
While the interviewees were not particularly concerned about gender issues in the 358 
technical team and public participation, some had voiced their opinions: 359 
“No one deliberately excludes women from participating [in the technical team]. Sometimes there is no 360 
suitable candidate.” (Academic) 361 
“Women usually do not attend public consultations because they need to take care of housework […] 362 
Husbands represent the family, so it is all right.” (Academic) 363 
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Notably, most of the interviewees were male, and only three female technical experts 364 
were identified and interviewed in this study. All interviewees, including the three female 365 
intermediaries, reported that they did not know of any other female technical experts. Besides, 366 
the technical experts consulted were mostly senior staff based in an administrative center (e.g., 367 
a capital city) and are not originating from rural communities that are affected by the AMDAL 368 
processes. Their seniority at work may affect their social status, social capital, and their 369 
perspectives to justice. The technical experts of AMDAL paid more attention to the issues 370 
related to distributive justice (i.e., cost and benefit) and procedural justice (influence and 371 
transparency of decision-making), rather than recognitional justice, including the participants’ 372 
gender and social status, which raises the question of whether the technical teams have 373 
adequately represented various stakeholders’ interests.  374 
4.2. Structural factors to norms travel between governance scales 375 
Social and cultural contexts underlying environmental policies and practices, particularly 376 
those perceived by the intermediaries, can affect the formation and mobilization of justice-377 
related norms in multi-scalar environmental governance. The prioritization of distributive and 378 
procedural justice is reflected in the intermediaries’ perspectives of how a ‘fair’ AMDAL 379 
practice ought to be. The interviewees pointed out some emerging concerns on distributive and 380 
procedural justice raised by the stakeholders. Regarding distributive justice, the interviewees 381 
identified the changing global perceptions of social impacts and sustainable development, 382 
which AMDAL should follow. 383 
“Minimizing social impacts become important […] Foreign investors are concerned about their 384 
reputation and hesitated to invest in conflicted areas […] The government needs to listen to this call.” 385 
(Academic and consultant) 386 
“Some investors want us to use international guidelines, such as RSPO [Responsible Sustainable Palm 387 
Oil] and FPIC [Free, prior, and informed consent] to conduct impact analysis. AMDAL needs to keep up 388 
to those new ideas of sustainability.” (Environmental consultant) 389 
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 Increasing calls on public participation and pressure from expanded media reach 390 
have led to more emphasis on equitable distribution of benefit and cost and decision-making 391 
procedures, as observed by the intermediaries.  392 
“Local people are increasingly concerned about their rights in decision-making. Now the AMDAL 393 
authority has to deal with it carefully.” (Government officer) 394 
“The government can close its eyes to project impacts when the public did not know what happened. 395 
They cannot do that anymore. As soon as there is protest, the whole country is informed by various 396 
media.” (Academic and consultant) 397 
 The interviewees also highlighted the political dynamic around environmental 398 
governance as some discussed the impacts of decentralization on local governance 399 
arrangement: 400 
“Autonomy is good. Districts have stronger power in deciding for activities like forestry and mining. We 401 
work more efficiently.” (Former senior government manager) 402 
“In the past, anyone can conduct impact analysis. Now [after decentralization], the consultants need to 403 
attend official training and get certified.” (Academic and consultant) 404 
Several structural barriers have constrained the mobilization of justice-related norms 405 
within the AMDAL debates. Many intermediaries pointed out the contested principles of 406 
market-based environmental management, which hindered them from advancing 407 
sustainability goals. One interviewee, for example, discussed the rising price of coal and 408 
increasing mining activities at the time of fieldwork: 409 
“International market decides supply, demand, and the price. We do not have much say on people’s 410 
decisions on their land.” (Senior government manager) 411 
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Some found it challenging to implement top-down policies that were constituted on the 412 
international or national level at the sub-national level due to lack of applicability to the local 413 
physical and social context: 414 
“International donors do not understand the situation here. They can travel from one country to another 415 
in a few hours, while it may take us a day to move between two villages. Now, they complain about our 416 
efficiency.” (Senior government manager) 417 
“Developed countries are those who can focus on environmental impacts. We [local officers] need to 418 
take care of many problems at the same time, and every single one of them is urgent.” (Government 419 
officer) 420 
“This country consists of thousands of island and ethnicities […] The central government should not 421 
apply a single set of regulation to all regions” (Government officer) 422 
Patriarchal norms held by the intermediaries have also restricted the mobilization of 423 
norms related to recognitional justice: 424 
“Some multinational companies wanted to involve women in public consultations […] Those women 425 
found it stressful to speak publicly. This is disrespectful. Now I do not allow companies to force women 426 
to participate.” (Senior government manager) 427 
Hierarchical bureaucracy cultures have also limited open conversation and the 428 
mobilization of justice-related norms in general. Several interviewees perceived that it could 429 
affect their organizational or personal interests if they openly object to the authority of their 430 
superiors: 431 
“Better not to say ‘no’ to the [AMDAL] reviewers. I do not want to annoy them, in case it affects [the 432 
result of] the application.” (Environment consultant) 433 
“I was promoted [as the senior government manager of the anonymized environmental division] from 434 
another agency. I had known nothing about the environment […] I was not obliged to accept that offer. 435 
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However, if I disobeyed my superior, I might never get promoted again.” (Former senior government 436 
manager) 437 
Intermediaries such as the technical experts of AMDAL were observant of the emerging 438 
norms related to environmental justice in local governance due to their close interaction with 439 
various stakeholders and policies and have provided meaningful insights to understanding 440 
existing and emerging values in the implementation of environmental policies. The political 441 
and economic objectives embedded in the international and national policy frameworks have 442 
also significantly changed the processes and outcomes of the intermediaries’ everyday 443 
practices at the sub-national level. Enabling the mobilization of justice-related norms between 444 
governance levels thus requires the understanding of the role of culture and capacity to find 445 
congruence with global sustainability objectives.  446 
4.3. Platforms through which norms travel in the AMDAL process 447 
This section demonstrates some institutional, physical, and social resources and platforms, 448 
through which justice norms travel in the practice of AMDAL. As the criteria for verifying 449 
project feasibility, many intermediaries considered the spatial plans (Rencana Tata Ruang 450 
Wilayah) made by provincial, district, and in rare cases, village governments to be particularly 451 
useful and supported them in negotiating the outcomes of development projects. Ambiguous 452 
or lack of land use planning, in contrast, has caused social conflicts and increased their 453 
workload as they must mediate those conflicts: 454 
“If a project does not fit the land-use plan, I can reject it immediately. It is straightforward - there is no 455 
space for negotiation.” (Government officer) 456 
 “The regional land-use plan is ambiguous [...] We [the technical team] are forced to make critical 457 
decisions on land-use, which is not under AMDAL’s authority.” (Senior government manager) 458 
To mobilize justice-related norms effectively, the intermediaries had discussed the 459 
need for setting up institutional strategies for two-way communication between the technical 460 
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team and the licensing authority. Some interviewees, for instance, shared their concerns about 461 
the transparency of decisions made on license granting because they could not follow up on the 462 
process of decision-making: 463 
“I do not know if the consultants understand my feedback or if they revise the analysis based on my 464 
recommendation […] We [the technical team] do not get to see the final report. There is no follow-up.” 465 
(Academic and consultant) 466 
“I send the [commission’s] decision to the licensing agency. However, I do not know if the applications 467 
are approved or rejected at their end. There is no means to monitor the process of permit issuance.” 468 
(Senior government manager) 469 
The intermediaries also found it hard to promote the value of sustainability and public 470 
welfare within the existing legislative framework that has prioritized economic growth, as 471 
shown in the following quotes:  472 
“Economic growth is prioritized over social welfare. AMDAL aims to reduce the impact, not to remove 473 
them. What a committee can do is limited.” (Government officer) 474 
“Provincial profit comes mainly from natural resource [exploitation]. If we were too strict with these 475 
activities, the profit decreased. The budget for environmental management would also decrease. This is 476 
the dilemma.” (Senior government manager) 477 
Interviews revealed that institutional resources were inadequate to support the 478 
technical experts in advancing justice and sustainability values in the AMDAL negotiations. 479 
Addressing these structural constraints thus requires attention on not only the norms included 480 
in environmental policies but also the national policies of decentralization in a broader context.  481 
Turning to physical resources that have affected everyday governance arrangement and 482 
provided platforms for the travel of justice-related norms, the intermediaries identified 483 
opportunities that both enabled or restricted their pursuit of organizational and personal 484 
agendas, including those related to environmental management. Although the interviewees 485 
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struggled to navigate their organizational and personal goals within the growth-oriented 486 
governance setting, they recognized that an improved financial condition of local governments 487 
has also improved their working conditions. Proper physical facilities and resources are 488 
perceived as essential to support the intermediaries in negotiating and mobilizing their 489 
prioritized values in local environmental practice. Infrastructure, such as road, airport, and 490 
mobile phone coverage, have enabled information exchange and access of knowledge service 491 
beyond an administrative territory, which has been particularly useful for areas that have 492 
limited institutional, physical, or social resources:  493 
“It lacks environmental experts in this area, so we need to invite technical reviewers externally […] A 494 
good review is only made possible by fairly-built roads or airports.” (Former senior government 495 
manager) 496 
“There is an online forum of AMDAL where people exchange information and experience. Anyone may 497 
ask questions about a certain location or [analysis] method or update any regional laws and regulations.” 498 
(Academic and consultant) 499 
The interviewees also demonstrated that the use of remote sensing and other 500 
technologies has provided supportive tools to achieve their work goals in an improved work 501 
environment: 502 
“It is more efficient to monitor forest fire by satellite – the cost is lower, and it is safer for our staff.” 503 
(Government officer) 504 
“Now, we use mobile devices to conduct the survey. It improves work conditions in the field […] You 505 
can also check if the person-in-charge fulfill their tasks” (Government officer) 506 
“We should use digitalized reports in AMDAL; the data archive will work better […] The public can 507 
access the data online.” (Former senior government manager) 508 
In contrast, the intermediaries perceived that access to high-quality data, including 509 
data scale, consistency, and access, have been significant barriers to a fair evaluation of 510 
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AMDAL. High-quality data therefore will be required for providing concrete scientific ground 511 
to support intermediaries in project negotiation.  512 
“It does not make sense to assess the impact on a village when the analysis is done at the district level. 513 
[…] We compromise because that is the only official data available.” (Government officer) 514 
“If I wanted to be perfect, I would need to collect data from several agencies and crosscheck them. 515 
However, you do not know whether and when they will reply. Furthermore, no one knows which set of 516 
data is the updated one for sure.” (Environmental consultant) 517 
Socially-derived resources and platforms that can affect the mobilization of norms 518 
largely concerned the social relationship and interaction between the official and unofficial 519 
actors involved in and affected by the AMDAL process. While many claimed that they did not 520 
have a personal interaction with the unofficial actors who worked beyond the institutional 521 
debates of AMDAL (i.e. military actors, police, and politicians), the interviewees generally 522 
perceived the strong influence of those actors on the outcomes of their everyday practices and 523 
involvement in AMDAL as shown in the following quotes.  524 
“There was this time when I could not proceed with an [AMDAL] application because it had lacked a 525 
document from [an anonymized governmental agency], which I had followed up for three months. One 526 
day I received a call from a general, asking about the process of this application […] The document I 527 
wanted was put on my desk the next morning.” (Anonymized technical expert) 528 
“It is hard to challenge a project, especially during an election year [...] Politicians need company 529 
sponsorship, they may take the money and intervene [the license granting process].” (Academic) 530 
How ‘closely’ the technical experts interact with each other has also affected the 531 
processes and outcomes of project negotiations in AMDAL. The governmental representatives 532 
were often chosen for different project reviews depending on their superiors’ arrangement. 533 
Several interviewees commented that they hesitated to engage in the discussion when they 534 
were unfamiliar with the other technical experts. In contrast, some found it harder to work 535 
with colleagues who collaborated with them in other programs: 536 
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“The heads of the [governmental] agencies may assign different staff to participate in different projects 537 
[…] I know who represents which agency, but I do not know if I can count on their expertise.” (Senior 538 
government manager) 539 
“I wanted to speak my mind frankly, but I do not want to be harsh [...] It would be easier if I could work 540 
with the people who know my personality.” [Senior government manager] 541 
“It is harder to give critical comments to a project if I know my colleague in the university conducts its 542 
analysis.” (Academic) 543 
While corruption persisted as a significant concern of promoting equitable decision-544 
making at the sub-national level, interviews revealed that issues of corruption should be 545 
considered alongside the power relationships that have encouraged or eliminated the behavior 546 
of corruption. The results presented until now show that several social and cultural factors have 547 
contributed to maintaining the status quo of the management system and associated power 548 
inequalities. Namely, patriarchal norms that have suppressed the voices of less powerful ones, 549 
including landless people, indigenous people and women, prior to decision-making; 550 
hierarchical bureaucracy norms that has encouraged individuals’ agendas on dominance and 551 
promotion for securing greater power in the organizations; complex organizational structure, 552 
clear cut assignment of functions, and lack of communication between divisions that have led 553 
to lower commitment to accountability; and finally, top-down and market-based management 554 
principles that allow little space for negotiations of norms to sub-national players. 555 
People’s interactions, which are formed through these societal norms and the favoring 556 
of those high in social dominance, promote corruption by enforcing power and status 557 
inequalities in the organizational structure. For instance, two anonymized governmental 558 
intermediaries perceived that they had been relocated to other departments due to their 559 
rejection of bribery. Unequal power relationships also contribute to preserving the role of 560 
corruption by rationalizing or legitimatizing the unethical doings as ‘culturally-fit.’ Being 561 
involved in corrupted practice was not only for the monetary gain but also seen as a social norm 562 
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in the sense that the intermediaries perceived they might also, in turn, need to bribe if they 563 
wanted to fulfill their tasks. In contrast, they would be socially penalized when they did not 564 
accept bribery, as illustrated in the following quotes: 565 
 “There was pressure from the top and bottom [to receive bribery]. The colleagues teased me. You make 566 
yourself unpopular if you do not corrupt [...] My wife might blame me if she knew I had rejected the 567 
bribery.” (Anonymized technical expert) 568 
“You would never get things done if you do not give money. The officers might say ‘you lack of this or 569 
that document’ or ‘the person-in-charge is not here’ […] If you give money, half-day.” (Anonymized 570 
technical expert) 571 
“We have a budget for bribery. You would know how to include this in the budget if you worked here [...] 572 
You need this to get things done.” (Anonymized technical expert) 573 
Issues of corruption can be coupled with low monetary and psychological incentives of 574 
carrying on equitable practices for the intermediaries. The technical experts were often 575 
overburdened by their workloads and worked part-time to make ends meet due to a low salary: 576 
“I do not feel appreciated […] I work as a lecturer, consultant, in AMDAL, and for other commissioned 577 
works […] I work so hard just to make ends meet.” (Academic and consultant) 578 
 “It is hard to nurture good technical staff in this civil servant system. Not only have you needed to 579 
master the skill, but also to learn many regulations. It is hard to compete with the private sector by 580 
lower pay and higher commitment.” (Senior government manager) 581 
Interviews also revealed psychological rewards that were important for motivating the 582 
intermediaries, notably the recognition of skills and in compliance with personal goals:  583 
“I am not trying to win acclaim but to make good use of my knowledge. However, it is hard when you 584 
work in the government.” (Government officer) 585 
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“I quit consultancy to join the technical team […] I earned more as a consultant. But I hope my 586 
knowledge can contribute to something bigger.” (Academic) 587 
The intermediaries perceived that common understandings of justice and sustainability 588 
goals were important for enabling such norms to travel vertically and horizontally. Not only 589 
should the intermediaries improve their knowledge of global environmental agendas, but also 590 
those whom the intermediaries seek to influence:  591 
“There is no training in reviewing AMDAL. We review the reports as we perceived as fair [...] If the 592 
authority does not prioritize the same thing as I, the project which I rejected might be approved anyway.” 593 
(Government officer) 594 
“I only know about the importance of sustainability after I got trained. However, the district/provincial 595 
heads never get trained […] How do I persuade them to prioritize sustainability despite other agendas?” 596 
(Former senior government manager) 597 
The intermediaries also provided useful insight into the potential of the private sector 598 
in advancing justice-related objectives in environmental management. Any empowerment 599 
initiatives should thus engage the private sector and identify the support needed by various 600 
private sector actors in achieving justice-related agendas. While the private sector actors were 601 
often perceived to create constraints to mobilize justice-related norms in local environmental 602 
practice, all interviewees had some experience of positive collaboration with private sector 603 
actors: 604 
“I suggested some companies to include free health service, which the government cannot afford, as part 605 
of their impact management. They agreed and implemented those programs with district health agencies. 606 
Sometimes companies simply do not know what they can do.” (Government officer) 607 
As the primary actor in environmental management, the private sector, especially local 608 
companies on a smaller scale, has not been fully engaged with local environmental 609 
management agendas, as perceived by the intermediaries. Identifying the barriers to executing 610 
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management responsibilities faced by the private sector thus may enhance the mobilization of 611 
justice-related norms: 612 
“Smaller companies cannot afford a good consultancy service. They do not know how to judge the quality 613 
of the analysis, or whether their consultants did their job.” (Academic and consultant) 614 
“Companies often do not understand what they had committed […] They only realize they did not have 615 
enough budget or ability when they started to implement the management plan as they had promised.” 616 
(Academic) 617 
 Interviews with these intermediaries have contributed to understandings of the 618 
institutional, physical, and social resources and platforms affecting the (re)production, 619 
consolidation, and mobilization of norms, including those related to justice, in the sub-national 620 
environmental management platforms. Unequal power relationships and social status have 621 
initiated and enforced patriarchal and hierarchical norms and have promoted the role of 622 
corruption in the EIA process. Most intermediaries therefore perceived EIA as constrained 623 
forums for debating the principles of environmental policies and negotiating justice-related 624 
norms compared to international and national arenas, and actively opted out of such debates. 625 
The resources identified have focused on those platforms which facilitate the travel of norms 626 
across the actors at the sub-national level. The interviews also portrayed the intermediaries’ 627 
perspectives on the influence of unofficial actors and informal relationships on their practices. 628 
Further focus on identifying who the unofficial actors are, how they are involved in the 629 
decision-making arena, and the extent to which they influence the formation and mobilization 630 
of justice-related norms in local environmental management will be useful to support 631 
intermediaries in the environmental practices. 632 
5. Discussion 633 
This section highlights our findings on the dynamics of justice brokerage through EIA 634 
intermediaries in Indonesia, and discusses its implications on the three key fields of inquiry, 635 
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i.e., environmental justice, critical institutionalism, and effectiveness of environmental impact 636 
assessment.  637 
Firstly, we argue that traditional social norms underpin the ideological differences on 638 
environmental justice. Environmental justice is conceptualized as being achieved through 639 
three interlinked dimensions, which are distributive, procedural, and recognitional justice 640 
(Schlosberg 2013; Sikor 2013). Our findings revealed that these justice elements were 641 
prioritized unevenly by the intermediaries spoken to. Distributive and procedural justice-642 
related norms were their primary concerns, while the objectives of recognitional justice were 643 
largely neglected. Power inequalities underlying the EIA process are found to promote 644 
recognitional injustice, as consistent with the works by Young (1990) and Fraser (2007; 2008). 645 
Traditional patriarchal norm persisted in the technical team also raises questions as to 646 
recognition to and equitable participation of culturally marginalized ones in the EIA practices, 647 
given inadequate attention paid by the intermediaries to unequal power relationships around 648 
gender, indigeneity, and class. Although the intermediaries did not bring up or discuss 649 
ethnicity as a factor, this paper acknowledges that ethnicity may play an underlying if minor 650 
role. While it is beyond the scope of this study to provide an in-depth perspective of the 651 
implication of ethnicity on justice brokerage, this may be an area that should be included in 652 
further research. 653 
The interviewees’ lack of awareness of recognitional justice has also created barrier to 654 
justice in the EIA process. Some consultants, government officers and academics interviewed 655 
positioned themselves as more ‘objective’ in the EIA process, emphasizing their technical and 656 
legal knowledge in evaluating project impacts in the way they deem to be ‘fair.’ Our findings, 657 
however, show that those intermediaries often fail to recognize and challenge the governance 658 
system that has excluded alternative voices in the first place. Such a pattern of prioritization to 659 
norms related to distributive justice was also reflected in the intermediaries’ interpretation of 660 
stakeholders’ interests underlying the EIA policies and practices. Namely, the market-oriented 661 
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principles and top-down policies imposed on local environmental practices have affected how 662 
they approached the emerging concerns of global sustainability agendas.  663 
Additionally, hierarchical work cultures endorsing power and status inequality help 664 
preserve the roles of unofficial actors (i.e., military actors, police, and politicians) and 665 
corruption in the EIA process, which further constrain the production and mobilization of 666 
norms related to recognitional justice. The EIA practices at the sub-national level therefore fall 667 
short of producing justice for the communities affected, as argued by Hasan, Nahiduzzaman, 668 
and Aldosary (2018), and yet the EIA intermediaries continue to adopt these practices. It thus 669 
allows for the involvement of the intermediaries in local EIA practices into empty mechanisms, 670 
whereby both the state and other powerful actors can maintain the rhetoric of justice and 671 
portray an image of fulfilling their justice obligations. Taking into account that a technical 672 
review process is commonly one of the initial stages in defining the scope of impact 673 
management in an EIA process, institutional participation of diverse cultural groups in the 674 
technical team will be required for promoting more equitable and sustainable outcomes of local 675 
environmental decision-making. 676 
Turning to our second field of inquiry, i.e., critical institutionalism, we argue that a 677 
complex organizational structure and lack of collaboration between divisions, in this case, 678 
have affected the intermediaries’ prioritizations and strategies of mobilizing justice-related 679 
norms. The decision-making process of EIA in Indonesia is divided into several stages (public 680 
consultation, technical evaluation, impact management evaluation, and license granting) in 681 
the decentralized governance system. The technical experts involved in this bureaucratic 682 
process have been constrained to other stages beyond their set roles in the technical 683 
evaluation of EIA. These institutional barriers embedded in the policies have hindered the 684 
technical experts from assessing the outcomes of their efforts and discouraged these 685 
intermediaries from investing efforts in the EIA practices and processes. 686 
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Also partly because of their set role as a technical reviewer, the intermediaries have 687 
emphasized the use of scientific knowledge and data to enable the mobilization of their agendas, 688 
instead of local justice concerns, contrasting to other findings (see Lindell 2009; Sternlieb et 689 
al. 2013). The intermediaries in this case study had attempted to mobilize their interpretations 690 
of justice horizontally within the sub-national level among their superiors and cohorts, aligning 691 
with previous studies (see Coggan et al. 2013; Hargreaves et al. 2013). However, these 692 
intermediaries tended to accept the existing policy framework of EIA and the institutional roles 693 
assigned without seeking to influence or intervene in policy-making upwards, in contrast to 694 
the theoretical expectation of promoting bottom-up policy formation through intermediaries 695 
(see Caouette 2007; Schomers, Sattler, and Matzdorf 2015; Schröter et al. 2018; Sternlieb et al. 696 
2013).  697 
In seeking collaboration to influence environmental outcomes as suggested by Schröter 698 
et al. (2018), the technical experts spoken to tended to work with other sub-national and 699 
technical actors, instead of connecting with civil society organizations and local communities 700 
as having been identified by Funder and Marani (2015). More importantly, the government 701 
officials consulted were moved from post to post and there was no culture of developing a deep 702 
professional profile in the EIA practice. Continued loss of experience by intermediaries can 703 
stem the travel of justice-related norms in local environmental practice as the same justice 704 
claims may be repeatedly encountered with no procedural learning. 705 
Our findings further covered institutional, physical, and social resources and platforms 706 
that are instrumental in enabling the mobilization of justice-related norms horizontally within 707 
the sub-national level. Social relationships among various official and unofficial actors (Pham 708 
et al. 2010) is a significant consideration of the interviewees in their EIA-related decision-709 
making. Not only may intermediaries prioritize different agendas in different social settings or 710 
forums, as others have found (Booth 2012; Hrabanski et al. 2013; Papillon and Rodon 2017), 711 
but our findings also suggest that a poor work environment and low incentives can influence 712 
the agendas they prioritize. Therefore, proper working conditions (Bosselmann and Lund, 713 
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2013), including workload, incentives, and safety, are critical for motivating intermediaries to 714 
engage in the environmental negotiations actively. Even though it is beyond the scope of this 715 
study, the literature in interactional justice which emphasizing the connections between the 716 
perceptions of justice and organizational behavior (see Bies 2015; Zapata, Olsen, and Martins 717 
2013) may be beneficial to further studies on the production and mobilization of justice-related 718 
norms through intermediary actors in environmental institutions.  719 
Finally, we argue for the significance of justice brokerage in affecting the effectiveness 720 
of environmental impact assessment. The issue of effectiveness in achieving sustainable 721 
development has been a key concern of EIA scholars and has been reviewed by others (e.g.,  722 
Cashmore et al. 2010; Morgan 2012). Studies have started to explore the potential of EIA as a 723 
tool to promote environmental justice goals in policy implementation, for example, Cashmore 724 
and Axelsson (2013) and Connelly and Richardson (2005). While the literature on 725 
environmental intermediaries has focused mainly on those engaged in international initiatives, 726 
as have been found by others (Bosselmann and Lund, 2013; Coggan et al., 2013; Hrabanski et 727 
al., 2013), our case study presents the barriers for local justice norms to travel upwards in the 728 
existing local management tools with regards to the intermediaries’ involvement.  729 
The technical experts in the EIA commission were informed as to some global 730 
sustainability and justice objectives, and actively sought to mobilize these norms into local 731 
practical arrangements. Our findings demonstrated the intermediaries’ constant attempts of 732 
seeking feasible solutions between the stakeholders’ needs, abilities, and budgets within the 733 
local capacity of technology and facilities. Identifying the resources needed by these 734 
institutional intermediaries, therefore, may be significant to improving local environmental 735 
practices and delivering environmental justice from a cost-effectiveness perspective. This 736 
empowerment strategy can be useful especially because many countries that possess rich forest 737 




6. Conclusion 740 
This article explored and exposed the justice-related norms prioritized by intermediaries; 741 
namely consultants, academics, and governmental officers, in the technical review process of 742 
EIA in Indonesia. It also examined the platforms and resources through which justice-related 743 
norms traveled, and the factors which facilitated or constrained the negotiation in the project 744 
debates of EIA at the sub-national level. Recognitional justice is the least attentive aspect of 745 
justice to the intermediaries, and our findings suggest that the EIA governance system 746 
underlying patriarchal and hierarchical structure has contributed to the low engagement of 747 
recognitional justice concerns. The intermediaries consulted nevertheless have actively sought 748 
to negotiate and mobilize distributive and procedural concerns within the sub-national level. 749 
Social relationships and working conditions are two key considerations in affecting 750 
intermediaries’ willingness to communicate for justice in this case study. Governance 751 
mechanisms that comply with national environmental laws, such as EIA, have facilitated 752 
necessary resource networks to be established and developed; such access to resources is 753 
essential to support intermediaries’ works. If integrating justice-related norms into the practice 754 
of local governance is the goal of global sustainable initiatives, more attention will be required 755 
to explore potentially useful national policies and platforms to influence environmental 756 
decision-making at the sub-national level. 757 
Appendix Interviewees’ information based on self-description  758 
All participants classified into one of these categories for anonymity: 759 
1. Senior Government Manager (including current and former Heads, secretariats, and 760 
other senior managers of Division of AMDAL, Disaster and risk management, 761 
Environmental monitoring, Forestry, Health, Labor and transmigration, and License 762 
issuance) 763 
2. Government Officer (including officers of Division of Environmental monitoring, 764 
Health, License issuance, Plantation, Spatial planning, and Transportation) 765 
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3. Academic (including specialists in biodiversity, hydrology, and spatial planning) 766 
4. Academic and consultant (including specialists in biodiversity and sociology) 767 
5. Environmental Consultant (including specialists in AMDAL, land-use licensing, and 768 
project management) 769 
 770 




1. Academic  42 M 16-20 1 
2. Academic 44 M 6-10 2 
3.  Academic 50 M 16-20 1 
4. Academic 
 
50 M Less than 1 2 
5. Academic 51 M 11-15 1 
6. Academic  58 M 6-10 2 
7. Academic and consultant 45 M - 2 
8. Academic and consultant 60 M 21-25 2 
9. Academic and consultant 63 M 21-25 1 
10. Environmental consultant 34 M 6-10 1 
11. Environmental consultant 51 M 16-20 3 
12. Environmental consultant 56 M 16-20 1 
13. Former senior government 
manager 
49 F 6-10 2 
14. Former senior government 
manager 
67 M 1-5 2 
15. Senior government manager 38 M 1-5 1 
16. Senior government manager 43 M  1-5 3 
17. Senior government manager 43 M 6-10 0 
18. Senior government manager 43 M 6-10 1 
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19. Senior government manager 46 M 11-15 1 
20. Senior government manager 47 M 16-20 1 
21. Senior government manager 49 F 16-20 1 
22. Senior government manager 50 M 6-10 2 
23. Senior government manager 51 M Less than 1 2 
24. Senior government manager 51 M 1-5 0 
25. Senior government manager 53 M 11-15 0 
26. Senior government manager 56 M 1-5 1 
27. Government officer 32 M 1-5 0 
28. Government officer 37 M 1-5 1 
29. Government officer 40 M 6-10 1 
30. Government officer 42 M Less than 1 0 
31. Government officer 42 M 1-5 2 
32. Government officer 42 M 11-15 1 
33 Government officer 43 M 1-5 0 
34. Government officer 43 M 1-5 0 
35. Government officer 43 M 1-5 1 
36. Government officer 46 M 6-10 2 
37. Government officer 49 F 1-5 2 
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